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Abstract
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve rests on an assumption not
mentioned in the literature. Specifically, firms that are price con-
strained align their production along the demand curve, ignoring the
effects of marginal cost on supply. This paper investigates what hap-
pens when the relationship between marginal cost and pricing con-
forms instead to standard microeconomic theory. It shows that the
New Keynesian Phillips Curve is invalid and prices are not procycli-
cal, but acyclical in this case. Therefore, if the assumption in question
is necessary to the model, it should be acknowledged for the sake of
transparency.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models have risen in pop-
ularity over the last fifteen years with the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC) as its backbone. Though few know the particulars, both the NKPC
and DSGE models are familiar to every economist.
But a not-talked-about assumption, made in the middle of constructing
the curve, is unusual. This paper challenges the NPKC manipulations on
setting the production of constrained firms (those that cannot reset price in
the NKPC specification) along the product’s demand curve. According to
marginal behavior, firms that cannot reset their price should choose produc-
tion levels so marginal costs are coherent with the imposed prices. Therefore,
firms will treat a binding price constraint as a price ceiling or a price floor.
Specifically, as price takers, they should equal marginal cost to their imposed
price, unless that leads to unsold surpluses. These firms would reduce pro-
duction if prices were too low instead of increasing them, while unconstrained
firms keep reacting to relative prices. Therefore, this type of price rigidity
will not produce procyclical inflation.
Furthermore, the paper investigates whether different forms for the mar-
ginal cost function can serve to fix the issue. Specifically, one alternative
specification poses that somehow marginal cost leads demand to equal supply
for constrained firms, while the other specification poses constant marginal
cost. These specifications fail, though results are informative.
This paper is to shows through simple algebra that standard microe-
conomic assumptions result in an intractable model with uninteresting re-
sults. Consequently, price rigidity relies on an unrealistic assumption. To
my knowledge, no work or textbook on the NKPC mentions this assumption.
The paper fills this gap, and makes a case for transparency: most economists
using the NKPC are unaware that the model’s producers actually bypass
their own supply curves.
The structure of the paper permits readers familiar with the NKPC to
skip ahead to Section 2 without loss of information. The next subsection
provides some background on the NKPC for a general audience. Section 2
constructs the first order conditions for the consumer and poses the problem
of the producers, then moves to three subsections. Subsection 2.1 presents
the usual manipulations behind the NKPC. Subsection 2.2 considers the
implications of constrained firms acting as price takers and Subsection 2.3
investigates whether different assumptions on marginal cost can resolve the
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issue. Finally, Section 3 concludes.
1.1 Background
First born of a simple statistical relationship with Keynesian justifications,
the Phillips Curve eventually evolved to an equation where the output gap
drives inflation. As the justifications became shaky, it became a simple re-
duced form model of a relation noticed two hundred years ago between the
boom-bust cycles and inflation-deflation.
The NKPC supplanted the Phillips Curve in response to Lucas Critique.
New Keynesian research had advanced, from the late seventies, concepts of
price rigidity that are coherent with rational expectations and that culmi-
nated with the NKPC. Originating with Roberts (1995) and Yun (1996), it
uses marginal cost instead of the output gap as the driver of inflation (though
the output gap can be used as a proxy for marginal cost). Now, helped by
the popularity of DSGE models, the NKPC dominates as the standard model
of inflation in modern macroeconomics. DSGE models came to the forefront
of macroeconomics starting with Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2003). Academia uses them to test theories while
central banks and international institutions rely on them as forecast models.1
Consequently, the NKPC, in the original or the hybrid form, is a central part
and permanent fixture of these models.
The NKPC combines monopolistic competition and price rigidities to
create a structural model where marginal costs drive inflation. Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) aggregation implements monopolistic competition and Calvo
(1983) contracts implements price rigidities. As a result, firms individually
set their prices as a function of marginal costs and of the probability of being
able to change them in the future; aggregation and log-linearization do the
rest. The resulting equation is the NKPC,
pit = γct + βEtpit+1,
where pi represents inflation, c, marginal cost, β, the discount factor and
γ = (1− ω)(1− βω)/ω, where ω represents a firm’s probability of not being
able to reset price in a given period.
1Sims (2012) and Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010) discuss the historical de-
velopment and current importance of DSGE modeling in academic work, while Dotsey
(2013), Smets, Christoffel, Coenen et al. (2010) and Botman, Rose, Laxton et al. (2007)
discuss its use by central banks and international institutions.
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Common critiques of the NKPC say it does not capture the persistence of
inflation or that marginal cost measures do not drive inflation. Specifically,
Fuhrer (1997) and Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) discuss the approach’ empirical
grounds for the persistence problem, while Rudd and Whelan (2005, 2007)
and Lawless and Whelan (2011) discuss the empirical fit of the labor share
proxy for marginal cost. In response to the inflation-persistence issue, Gal´ı
and Gertler (1999) add a share of irrational, or rule-of-thumb, producers to
create the hybrid-NKPC. As for the labor share, as seen with Gal´ı, Gertler
and Lo´pez-Salido (2005), the point is not yet settled.
Furthermore, the NKPC raises two theoretical issues. First, marginal
cost measures seem arbitrary; it can be the output gap, the labor share
or the derivative of all production inputs.2 That some capital cannot be
considered marginal cost, nor can some labor, complicate the issue; in other
words, marginal cost may not be identifiable. Second, the nume´raire always
disappear in the microeconomic models we learned in school, how come it
still matters in this model? Are not real variables invariant to the unit of
account? The reason: basic microeconomic models are static; the survival
of the nume´raire comes from the dynamic implementation. But this comes
from a series of modeling decisions that may not pass Occam’s razor.3
This paper’s critique of the NKPC is the subject of the next section.
2 How producers set supply
This section starts with a standard, if incomplete, derivation of the NKPC.
It details the construction of the first order conditions on the consumer side
and poses the problem on the producer side. Then, Subsection 2.1 shows
the usual manipulations. In Subsection 2.2, I depart from standard manip-
ulations by imposing that constrained firms try to set their production to
make marginal costs equal to the imposed prices. Figure 1 illustrates the
difference between Subsection 2.1 and Subsection 2.2. Finally, Subsection
2.3 investigates whether restrictions on marginal costs can fix the problem.
Here are the assumptions of the model as one can make them out:
2See Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for a discussion of different marginal cost mea-
sures.
3Incidentally, the Occam’s razor argument was the most important one raised against
monopolistic competition in the first place, as noted in the Introduction of Brakman and
Heijdra (2004, p. 10).
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Assumption 1 There is one representative consumer who values products
with a constant elasticity of scale (CES) function with an elasticity parame-
ter, .
Assumption 2 Time preferences are represented by a constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) function with a risk-aversion coefficient, ρ.
Assumption 3 All firms are ultimately owned by the consumer whose stochas-
tic discount factor determines profit discounting.
Assumption 4 All firms are symmetrical and each produces a differentiated
and perishable product.
Assumption 5 All firms have a constant probability ω of not being able to
reset their price at the next period.
Assumption 6 All production goes into consumption, there is no capital.
Assumption 7 All firms have an increasing-in-production marginal cost
function.
These assumptions are intentionally too restrictive. Assumptions 2 and
Assumptions 3 can be replaced by posing another reasonable stochastic dis-
count factor, the probabilities can be generalized in Assumption 5 and the
Assumption 6 can also be generalized. Those restrictions are standard and
meant to simplify exposition. Additionally, Subsection 2.3 will relax As-
sumptions 7.
Before the next subsections, I present the non-contentious part of the
NKPC derivation: the first order conditions for the consumer and the prob-
lem of the producers.
In the familiar consumer side equations, consumers optimize using cost
minimization subject to a fixed utility constraint, or
min
yj,t
∫ 1
0
pj,tyj,tdj subject to Yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
−1

j,t dj
) 
−1
,
where pj,t and yj,t are respectively the price and production of firm j at time
t and Yt represents the aggregate production measure at time t. The con-
straint is a CES utility function for a continuum of products. The CES utility
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function is standard in macroeconomic models, first as a homogeneous func-
tion, second as it aggregates into a CRRA utility function, also a standard
of macroeconomic models.
The minimization results in the first order conditions for each product j
which consist of the utility constraint and
pj,t − PtY
1

t y
− 1

j,t = 0, (1)
where Pt is the Lagrange multiplier, but also represents the price index, i.e.
the marginal utility of an additional unit of aggregate production.
The intertemporal profit maximization problem of the firm j is
max
pj,t
{
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)−ρ ( pj,t
Pt+i
yj,t+i − Ct+i (yj,t+i)
)}
, (2)
where C represents real total cost as a function of production and common
to all firms and ωi represents the probability, uniform across firms, for a
firm of not being able to reset price until time t + i. Notice the use of the
CRRA stochastic discount factor for discounting profits, with β, the ordinary
discount factor, and ρ, the relative-risk-aversion coefficient. This stochastic
discount factor comes from production entirely going into consumption.
2.1 Supply on demand
This subsection replicates the manipulations behind the NKPC as seen in the
literature. It goes from the producer first order condition to the resulting
price index and price aggregation equation. The subsection shows that those
manipulations rely on producers having a supply-on-demand business model.
Calculations in this subsection stop short of deriving the NKPC as soon as
the link between inflation and marginal cost becomes obvious.
The first order condition comes after inserting yj,t from equation (1) into
equation (2), yielding
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
Pt
) (
(1− ) pj,t
Pt+i
+ ct+i(yj,t+i)
)
= 0. (3)
where c represents the real marginal cost function. Essentially, the insertion
of equation (1) means constrained firms choose production level along the
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consumer demand curve yielding supply on demand where the demand func-
tion, equation (1), always applies. This insertion is the point of contention of
the paper; firms ignore there own supply incentives. In simple terms, the in-
sertion of future demand supposes some kind of commitment possible to keep
firms from behaving as rational price takers in the future, but the literature
offers no such commitment argument.
With supply on demand, the demand function applies to every product,
yielding a simple price index,
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
p1−j,t dj
) 1
1−
, (4)
from a straightforward insertion of the demand functions into the utility
constraint. In turn, because of the symmetry of firms, the price index solves
recursively to
P 1−t = (1− ω)(p∗t )1− + ωP 1−t−1 , (5)
where ω also acts as the share of constrained firms and p∗t represents the
optimal price common to unconstrained firms. Lagged prices appear because
every firm has a uniform probability, ω, of not being able to reset its price,
thus creating a mirror image of the price index.
The NKPC therefore relies on the equation (5) to yield contemporary
inflation through Pt−1 by combining the equation with equation (3) after
manipulations involving log-linearization. Note that the level of the P ’s is
unidentified in equation (3), a homogeneous function in only contemporary
or future (not fixed in advance) prices. Past prices in equation (5) and
marginal costs in equation (3) produce an inflation equation, the NKPC. This
is straightforward, the reader can be spared the subsequent manipulations.
2.2 Supply at salable marginal cost
This subsection uses standard microeconomic behavior instead of supply on
demand used in the previous subsection. It results in a different production
schedule for constrained firms as illustrated in Figure 1. Furthermore, the
resulting price index does not generate a well behaved price aggregation
equation and prices stop being procyclical.
Since constrained firms are constrained in their price, not their produc-
tion, they choose a production level along the consumer demand curve only
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if the relative price they face is too high. Firms produce only what can be
sold with a relative price too high for a perishable product.
Otherwise, constrained firms choose a production level along the marginal
cost curve if the relative price they face is too low. Maximization of profits
under a fixed price results in the price taker setting nominal marginal cost to
equal price, as they choose yj,t to maximize pj,tyj,t − PtCt(yj,t). But because
the product is perishable, these firms will instead set production to the min-
imal production level from the two curves. Thus, this type of firm behavior
yields supply at salable marginal cost for constrained firms, or
yj,t = min
{
c−1t
(
pj,t
Pt
)
,
(
pj,t
Pt
)−
Yt
}
, ∀j ∈ {constrained firms},
where c−1 represents the inverse of the marginal cost function.
Figure 1: Production determination for a constrained firm
p j,t/Pht
p j,t/Pot
p j,t/Plt
y j,t
p j,t/Pt
Supply on demand
p j,t/Pht
p j,t/Pot
p j,t/Plt
y j,t
p j,t/Pt
Supply at salable maginal cost
Note: A low relative price can mean an increase or a decrease in production depending on
how producers set supply.
Figure 1 illustrates both supply on demand and supply at salable marginal
cost. In this figure, P o represents the optimal price index from the stand-
point of the constrained firm, while P l and P h represent price indexes that
are respectively lower and higher than P o. The supply-on-demand business
model, from standard NKPC manipulations, associates P h with increased
production yielding a model where firms forced to sell at low relative prices
produce more. Using standard microeconomic behavior instead, any devia-
tion from P o lowers production. A surprise rise in the price index does not
raise production; in fact, any surprise lowers production.
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Furthermore, supply at salable marginal cost does not produce a well-
behaved price index, but
Pt =
∫ zt
0
c−1t
(
pj,t
Pt
)
P t Yt

−1

dj +
∫ 1
zt
p1−j,t dj

1
1−
.
where zt expresses the proportion of firms that set price equal to marginal
cost at time t. In addition, the proportion of firms that are both constrained
and set production along the demand curve is (ω− zt), while the proportion
of unconstrained firms is (1−ω). Moreover, zt depends on the other variables.
This proportion varies through time according to the movement of that very
price index, a price index that makes it impossible to generate the aggregation
in equation (5).
Of course, generating the aggregation equation is not the point. The
point is, the resulting inflation equation, if an inflation equation is possible,
will not imply procyclical inflation. The rest of this paper will not determine
what this inflation equation looks like, because the equation would not be
interesting. A certain result, procyclical inflation, justified the assumptions
behind the NKPC; finding an inflation equation free of that result is of little
value.
2.3 Alternative marginal costs
The previous subsection relied on the standard assumption of an increasing
marginal cost curve. This subsection investigates two other specifications.
The first supposes that somehow there exists a macroeconomic argument
restricting the constrained firms’ product equilibrium always in the inter-
section between the demand curve and the marginal cost (supply) curve.
This specification’s analysis shows the model creates a proportionality be-
tween prices and nominal marginal costs that makes the NKPC vanish and a
model of inflation impossible. The second specification supposes that every
firm’s marginal cost is constant. That specification’s analysis shows some
firms refuse to produce and the NKPC does not fare better.
The only way for the production of constrained firms to lie along the de-
mand curve would be that prices also equal nominal marginal costs for every
constrained firm. Then, going back to the first order condition, equation (3)
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yields, when future nominal marginal costs equal prices,
(1− )pj,t
Pt
+ ct(yj,t) + Et
∞∑
i=1
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
Pt
)−1 pj,t
Pt
= 0.
Therefore, firms set marginal costs according to
pj,t =
{
Ptct(yj,t) if j ∈ [0, ω]
µtPtct(yj,t) if j ∈ (ω, 1] , (6)
with a markup, µt, common to firms that can reset price, of
µt ≡ 
(
− 1− Et
∞∑
i=1
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
Pt
)−1)−1
.
Note that without price rigidity (ω = 0), the static monopolistic competition
price, or Lerner formula, determines the markup, µt = /( − 1). More
importantly, the equation for µt puts everything in terms of growth, so even
if Pt and Yt appear, the equation, like equation (3) is entirely prospective, as
Pt serves only to express future prices in relative terms.
As a result of equation (6), the price index, equation (4), becomes
Pt =
(∫ ω
0
(Ptct(yj,t))
1−dj +
∫ 1
ω
(µtPtct(yj,t))
1−dj
) 1
1−
.
Meaning, nominal marginal cost and the price index are proportional, or
simply put, ∫ ω
0
ct(yj,t)
1−dj + µ1−t
∫ 1
ω
ct(yj,t)
1−dj = 1.
This equation shows that the index applied to real marginal cost is invariant
and consequently, because of the symmetry between firms, the price level
does not affect production. In other words, for whichever direction con-
strained firms have to move their marginal cost, unconstrained firms will
move theirs in the opposite direction so the price index moves independently
of real marginal cost. This result holds not only when some firms are con-
strained in the price they set, but also when those that can set their price
have to consider its effects on future profits. Although still technically valid,
equation (5) is irrelevant because the optimal price, p∗t , compensates for the
old price, Pt−1, by way of unconstrained firms adjusting production, and
prices, to respond to the adjustment made by constrained firms.
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Ergo, equilibrium between supply and demand for every firm leads to the
price index disappearing and the NKPC not existing. The disappearance
of the price index, essentially a nume´raire, appears a logical consequence
of posing equilibrium, because the nume´raire always disappear in ordinary
microeconomic models. This specification fails, and that leads us to the other
specification.
Finally, the other specification poses that marginal costs are constant.
But with marginal costs constant, constrained firms refuse to produce when
prices are under marginal costs. The problem admits only a border solution,
yj,t =
 0 if pj,s < Ptc¯t(pj,t
Pt
)−
Yt if pj,s ≥ Ptc¯t ,
where c¯t represents the common marginal cost. Low relative prices still means
decreased production, more producers halting production to be exact, and
the price index,
Pt =
(∫
[pj,t≥Ptc¯t]
p1−j,t dj
) 1
1−
,
is still not well behaved and makes it impossible to generate the aggregation
in equation (5). Specifically, the integral’s support depends on the price
index as it more or less counts the number of pj,t above the common nominal
marginal cost.
In conclusion, this subsection showed that the assumption of supply on
demand cannot realistically be replaced by an assumption on the form of the
marginal cost function.
3 Conclusion
As seen in Subsection 2.2, posing standard microeconomic behavior for how
prices affect marginal costs invalidates the NKPC. As seen in Subsection 2.3,
tinkering with marginal costs does not help. Therefore, if this paper does
not aim to invalidate the NKPC; it aims to point to an assumption made
unknowingly. Keynesian researchers can — and should — choose to ignore
the issue for practical reasons, but be forthcoming about it by acknowledg-
ing the problem, and mentioning, as an assumption, this supply-on-demand
business model that producers have.
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So, herein lies the dilemma: standard microeconomics yields a compli-
cated model with uninteresting results, and the NKPC relies on an unreal-
istic assumption. It may not be the case that price rigidity is a dead end; it
is certainly the case the assumption should be public.
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A Additional material intended for referees
The following calculations are excessively detailed.
A.1 Calculation of equation (1)
Take the Lagrangian,
L =
∫ 1
0
pj,tyj,tdj − Pt
((∫ 1
0
y
−1

j,t dj
) 
−1 − Yt
)
,
with a first derivative of
pj,t − Pt 
− 1
(∫ 1
0
y
−1

j,t dj
) 
−1−1 − 1

y
−1

−1
j,t = 0,
which simplifies to
pj,t − Pt
(∫ 1
0
y
−1

j,t dj
) 
−1
1

y
− 1

j,t = 0,
then, inserting the utility constraint, yields equation (1),
pj,t − PtY
1

t y
− 1

j,t = 0.
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A.2 Calculation of equation (3)
Start with equation,
max
pj,t
{
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)−ρ ( pj,t
Pt+i
yj,t+i − Ct+i (yj,t+i)
)}
,
replace yj,t+i with its demand function,
max
pj,t
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)−ρ( pj,t
Pt+i
)1−
Yt+i − Ct+i
( pj,t
Pt+i
)−
Yt+i
 ,
then perform maximization to yield
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)−ρ(1− )( pj,t
Pt+i
)−
Yt+i
Pt+i
+ ct+i(yj,t+i)
(
pj,t
Pt+i
)−−1
Yt+i
Pt+i
 = 0,
then, by rearranging the terms, get
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)−ρ (Pt+i
pj,t
)
Yt+i
(
(1− ) 1
Pt+i
+ ct+i(yj,t+i)
1
pj,t
)
= 0.
Then, multiplying by pj,t and dividing by Yt, it yields
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
pj,t
) (
(1− ) pj,t
Pt+i
+ ct+i(yj,t+i)
)
= 0.
Finally, by multiplying by pj,t and dividing by P

t , it yields equation (3),
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
Pt
) (
(1− ) pj,t
Pt+i
+ ct+i(yj,t+i)
)
= 0.
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A.3 Calculation of equation (4)
Take equation,
pj,t − PtY
1

t y
− 1

j,t = 0,
rewrite it as
yj,t = P

t Ytp
−
j,t ,
insert in the utility constraint to get
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
(
P t Ytp
−
j,t
) −1
 dj
) 
−1
= YtP

t
(∫ 1
0
p1−j,t dj
) 
−1
.
Isolating Pt yields equation (4).
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
p1−j,t dj
) 1
1−
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A.4 Calculation of the last equation of Section 2.2
Start with
yj,t = min
{
c−1t
(
pj,t
Pt
)
,
(
pj,t
Pt
)−
Yt
}
,
and insert it in the utility constraint after defining z as the proportion of
firms that are both constrained and set marginal cost equal to price,
Yt =
∫ zt
0
c−1t
(
pj,t
Pt
) −1

dj +
∫ ω
zt
((
pj,t
Pt
)−
Yt
) −1

dj +
∫ 1
ω
((
pj,t
Pt
)−
Yt
) −1

dj


−1
,
which can be written
Yt =
∫ zt
0
c−1t
(
pj,t
Pt
) −1

dj +
∫ 1
zt
((
pj,t
Pt
)−
Yt
) −1

dj


−1
,
and simplifies as
1 =
∫ zt
0
c−1t
(
pj,t
Pt
)
Yt

−1

dj +
∫ 1
zt
(
pj,t
Pt
)1−
dj,
then, multiplying all terms by P 1−t ,
P 1−t =
∫ zt
0
c−1t
(
pj,t
Pt
)
P t Yt

−1

dj +
∫ 1
zt
p1−j,t dj,
which yields the last equation of Section 2.2,
Pt =
∫ zt
0
c−1t
(
pj,t
Pt
)
P t Yt

−1

dj +
∫ 1
zt
p1−j,t dj

1
1−
.
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A.5 Calculation of the first equation of Section 2.3
Start with equation (3),
Et
∞∑
i=0
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
Pt
) (
(1− ) pj,t
Pt+i
+ ct+i(yj,t+i)
)
= 0,
and impose pj,t = Ptct+i(yj,t), ∀i > 0 (notice the summation will now start
at 1),
ω0β0
(
Yt
Yt
)1−ρ (
Pt
Pt
) (
(1− )pj,t
Pt
+ ct(yj,t)
)
+Et
∑∞
i=1 ω
iβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
Pt
) (
(1− ) pj,t
Pt+i
+  pj,t
Pt+i
)
= 0,
which simplifies to
(1− )pj,t
Pt
+ ct(yj,t) + Et
∞∑
i=1
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
Pt
) pj,t
Pt+i
= 0.
which can be written as the first equation of Section 2.3,
(1− )pj,t
Pt
+ ct(yj,t) + Et
∞∑
i=1
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
Pt
)−1 pj,t
Pt
= 0.
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A.6 Calculation of the markup in Section 2.3
Start with the previous equation,
(1− )pj,t
Pt
+ ct(yj,t) + Et
∞∑
i=1
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
Pt
)−1 pj,t
Pt
= 0,
and multiply by Pt,
(1− )pj,t + Ptct(yj,t) + Et
∞∑
i=1
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
Pt
)−1
pj,t = 0,
then regroup pj,t and Ptct(yj,t),(
1− + Et
∞∑
i=1
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
Pt
)−1)
pj,t = −Ptct(yj,t),
then, pj,t = µtPtct(yj,t) means
µt = −
(
1− + Et
∞∑
i=1
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
Pt
)−1)−1
,
or,
µt = 
(
− 1− Et
∞∑
i=1
ωiβi
(
Yt+i
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+i
Pt
)−1)−1
.
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A.7 Calculation of the last equation of Section 2.3
Start with
yj,t =
 0 if pj,s < Ptc¯t(pj,t
Pt
)−
Yt if pj,s ≥ Ptc¯t ,
insert in the utility constraint equation,
Yt =
(∫
[pj,t<Ptc¯t]
0 dj +
∫
[pj,t≥Ptc¯t]
(
P t Ytp
−
j,t
) −1
 dj
) 
−1
,
which simplifies to
Yt = YtP

t
(∫
[pj,t≥Ptc¯t]
p1−j,t dj
) 
−1
,
that, isolating Pt yields the last equation of Section 2.3,
Pt =
(∫
[pj,t≥Ptc¯t]
p1−j,t dj
) 1
1−
.
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